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Havighurst: The Continuing Inutility of Employee Stock Options in CloselyHeld

THE CONTINUING INUTILITY OF EMPLOYEE
STOCK OPTIONS IN CLOSELY HELD

BUSINESSES*
CLARK C. HAVIGHURST* *

Small businessmen had a right to expect that the 1964 amendments
to the Internal Revenue Code would substantially improve the
utility of employee stock options to corporations whose stock is not
widely traded. Such an expectation would have been based on recognition of the handicap under which such corporations operated in
competing for top managerial talent with publicly held concerns that
regularly employed tax-favored stock options as a compensation
medium. This handicap to closely held businesses resulted in large
part from their difficulty in accurately valuing their stock for purposes of setting an option price that complied with the Code's pre1964 requirements.
As enacted, the 1964 amendments substantially ameliorated the
employee's adverse tax consequences where the employer inadvertently failed to meet the Code's option price requirements and seemed
thereby to have improved the availability of tax-favored options to
closely held businesses. However, analysis of other provisions of the
new law yields the conclusion that Congress has not materially improved the utility of stock options to small firms. Such improvement
as there has been in the small business's relative position is largely
the indirect result of substantial reduction in the attractiveness of
options that may henceforth be offered by publicly held companies.
This article will review briefly the changes made in the stock
option provisions by the 1964 amendments" and will discuss the factors bearing on the present utility of tax-favored options in small
*This article is a somewhat expanded version of materials in chapters 1 and
9 of the author's book, DEFERRED COMPENSATION FOR KEY EMPLOYEES: A PLANNING

GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESSMEN AND LAWYERS (1964) published by Callaghan & Co.,
6141 N. Cicero Ave., Chicago.
**A.B. 1955, Princeton University; J.D. 1958, Northwestern University; Associate
Professor of Law, Duke University.
1. The most comprehensive review of the new stock option provisions is Baker,
Employee Stock Option Plans Under the Revenue Act of 1964, 20 TAx L. Rxv. 77
(1964). For another consideration of the effect of the new law on small businesses,
see Rothschild, The New Stock Option: Problems of the Smaller Company, 33
FoR1Am L. REv. 393 (1965).
This discussion of the 1964 amendments is for the most part limited to the
subject of "qualified" stock options created pursuant to INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§422. However, the amendments also created another new type of option in §423,
which sets forth the requirements of "employee stock purchase plans." Plans of
this variety are similar to restricted stock option programs except that (1) all
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businesses. In addition to the continuing problems of achieving safe
compliance with the Internal Revenue Code, there are numerous
practical considerations suggesting that stock options are seldom appropriate in the close corporation context.
BACKGROUND AND SUBSTANCE OF THE

1964 AMENDMENTS

Corporations found at an early date that giving stock options to
employees was a valuable means of creating incentive for improved
employee performance. However, the pre-1964 restricted stock option,
having been created by Congress in 1950 and endowed with favorable
tax attributes, rapidly developed into a commonly accepted compensation device under which incentive was only a secondary consideration. The primary motive in the adoption of restricted stock option
plans, it seems clear, was usually the desire to gain for highly paid
personnel the tax relief accompanying such plans and a chance to
participate on a favorable basis in the generally upward trend of the
2
stock market.
The 1964 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code did away
with restricted stock options except to the extent that outstanding
employees meeting certain minimum service requirements must be allowed to
participate and (2) the price provisions of the option and its duration must
adhere to stringent new requirements. In addition, the 1964 amendments perpetuated the old restricted option provisions in §424 in order that preexisting
options of this kind would not be affected by the changes in the law. Small
businesses are not likely to be interested in these aspects of the present law on
stock options.
2. Even this conclusion may not be cynical enough since there are several
bases for concluding that deception of shareholders and the public was an important objective of many stock option programs: (1) disclosure of management
salaries did not take into account gains accrued through the possession and exercise
of options, and such disclosure as was required was not easily interpreted or translatable into dollar amounts. See, e.g., SEC Form S-1, Items 17-18; SEC Reg. X-14,
Schedule 14A, Items 7, 11, 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-l (1964). (2) Because remuneration
by the option route occurred through the dilution of the shareholders' equity,
the expense did not appear in income statements (although it was reflected in
earnings-per-share figures once the options were exercised). (3) Because no tax
deduction was allowed for compensation accomplished through the option route,
the net cost to the corporation of providing a particular after-tax return to a
given employee was apt to be greater (except in the case of executives in the
highest tax brackets) than if cash were paid. Cf. text accompanying notes 53-54
infra. For a more complete discussion of the objections to the use of stock
options, see Hearings on the Tax Recommendations of the President Contained in
His Message of Jan. 24, 1963, Before the House Committee on Ways and Means,
88th Cong., Ist Sess. 480-97 (Comm. Print 1963) [hereinafter cited as "President's
1963 Tax Message"]. Criticism by shareholders of the use of options was less
vigorous than it might have been because of the concurrent benefits accruing to
them from the appreciation in the value of the company's stock.
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options granted under the old law may continue to qualify for advantageous tax treatment.3 In the place of the restricted option,
Congress introduced the "qualified" option,4 which is similar to the
restricted option in many respects but which is characterized by
stricter requirements. A review of the characteristics of the two types
of options is helpful in appraising the extent of the handicap under
which small businesses operated in this area prior to 1964 and in appreciating the extent to which their relative position was affected by
the 1964 legislation.
RestrictedStock Options
Basically, the Internal Revenue Code prior to the 1964 amendments5 permitted the optionee under a restricted stock option to omit
reporting any gain when he acquired stock at a bargain price through
the exercise of the option. The Code then taxed the optionee, who
was required to be an employee, at long-term capital gain rates on
the gain realized when he eventually sold the stock after satisfying
certain holding period requirements. 6 By way of further generosity,
the tax law excused from the income tax any gain that was not realized by sale of the stock prior to the death of the optionee." These
substantial benefits could be obtained only if the option program met
the statutory requirements of restricted status.
The foregoing benefits continue to be available under qualified
stock option plans established under the 1964 amendments, which
made changes only in the requirements to be met in qualifying for
favorable tax treatment and, in some cases, the consequences of departing from such requirements. The narrower requirements applicable to qualified stock option plans have the effect of somewhat curtailing the utility of stock options as a supplementary compensation
device and of reemphasizing their incentive aspect. The major change
3. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §424. The grant of new restricted options after
Dec. 31, 1963, pursuant to preexisting arrangements is permitted by INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §424 (c)(3).
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §422.
5. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, ch. 1, §421, 68A Stat. 142 (1954). Most of the
provisions of old §421 are carried over in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §424.

6. However, where the option price was less than 95%" but not less than
85% of the market price of the stock on the date the option was granted, the
employee was taxed at ordinary income rates on his gain up to the difference
between the option price and such market value. Similar provision is now made
in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §424 (c) (1).
7. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §1014. Again there was a partial exception where
the option price was between 85% and 95% of the market value of the stock when
the option was granted. Under such circumstances, a tax was imposed at ordinary
income rates on the gain up to the difference between the option price and such
market value. Similar provision is now made in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §424 (c) (1).
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is an increase from six months to three years in the period of time
that the employee must hold the stock acquired under the option in
order to be entitled to capital gain treatment on its sale. 8 Also, the
life of the option may be no more than five years, whereas ten-year
options were previously allowed. 9 From the point of view of the small
business, however, the most important change probably lies in the
area of the consequences of a failure to meet the requirement that the
option price bear a particular relationship to the fair market value
of the stock at the time the option is granted. This area is more fully
discussed below.
Requirements of Qualified Status
A qualified stock option program under the 1964 amendments
must meet a variety of statutory requirements in order to obtain
beneficial tax treatment for the participating employees. Many of
these requirements are entirely new or differ substantially from the
requirements previously applicable to restricted options. The program must be embodied in a plan setting forth the aggregate number
of shares that may be issued under options and identifying the employees, or the class of employees, eligible to participate in the
program.' 0 This plan must be approved by the shareholders of the
employer corporation within a year before or after its adoption" and
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §422 (a) (1); Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.422-1 (a), 29
Fed. Reg. 18069 (1964). See note 14 infra. Previously the employee was required
to hold the stock until at least two years after the option was granted. The
three-year rule makes this additional rule superfluous. The lengthening of the
holding period was to assure that employees will acquire a longer-lasting stake
in the business and to inhibit rapid sale of the stock for the purpose of raising
capital for the exercise of new options. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
64 (1963). Cf. President's 1963 Tax Message 488-91.
9. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §422(b)(3); Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.422-2(d), 29
Fed. Reg. 18071 (1964). The purpose of this change was to hasten the acquisition
of a proprietary interest in the business. This was deemed desirable because
employees tended to delay exercise as long as possible in order to avoid making
a capital outlay and because appreciation through the long-term rise in stock
prices could not be distinguished from gains attributable to management performance. H.R. Rr. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1963).
10. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §422(b)(1); Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.422-2(b)(3),
29 Fed. Reg. 18070 (1964). This is a new requirement. Under the Proposed Regulations the designation of "key employees" as recipients is acceptable. See also
H.R. REP. No. 1149, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1964); S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 92 (1964).
11. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §422 (b) (1); Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.422-2 (b) (1),
(2), 29 Fed. Reg. 18070 (1964). This new requirement of shareholder approval
was apparently intended to guarantee to shareholders a direct control over the
use of options, which have often been objected to on the ground of unfairness to
shareholders. See note 2 supra. A substantial number of companies would have
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must not have a duration of more than ten years after its adoption
12
or, if earlier, the date of shareholder approval.
To be a qualified stock option, an option granted under the plan
13
must not be exercisable after five years from the date of grant.

It

must be nontransferable except upon death and must be exercisable
only by the grantee during his lifetime. 4 In order to prevent the
downward revision of the option price by the granting of new options
in place of the old,' 5 the option is required to provide that it is not
exercisable so long as there is outstanding any other qualified stock
option (or a surviving restricted option) previously granted;'16 it is
expressly provided that an option is deemed to be outstanding until
it is exercised in full or expires by lapse of time. 7 The exercise price
of a qualified option must not be less than the fair market value of
the stock at the time the option is granted.' 8 However, as discussed
to submit the plan to shareholders anyway. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN.
§18A (1960); New York Stock Exchange Company Manual A - 118-20 (1956).
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §422(b)(2); Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.422-2(c),
29 Fed. Reg. 18071 (1964). Previously there was no limit on the duration of the
option program.
13. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
14. INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, §422(b) (6); Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.422-2(g), 29
Fed. Reg. 18072-73 (1964). This is similar to the old provision. If the employee
dies, his estate and heirs are relieved from the three-year holding period requirement (see note 8 supra and accompanying text) and the requirement that exercise
occur not more than three months after the termination of employment. (See
note 19 infra and accompanying text.) INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §421 (c)(1) (A);
Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.421-8(c), 29 Fed. Reg. 18066-68 (1964).
15. Prior law permitted the resetting of the option price at a lower figure
where a substantial decline in the value of the optioned stock could be demonstrated. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, ch. 1, §421 (e), 68A Stat. 145 (1954). In addition,
new options providing a lower option price could be granted and exercised while
the old options remained outstanding. See Rev. Rul. 59-55, 1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 94;
Rev. Rul. 61-219, 1961-2 CuM. BuLL. 107. It was considered objectionable that
employees could profit even though the market value of the company's shares declined after options were first granted. H. R. REP'. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
68 (1963). See also President's 1963 Tax Message 483-84.
16. Irr. RFv. CODE OF 1954, §422(b)(5); Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.422-2 (f), 29
Fed. Reg. 18071-72 (1964). See note 15 supra. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §422 (c) (6),
and §1.422-2 (f) (1) (ii) of the Proposed Regulations provide that this requirement
will not apply if the new option provides for the same or a higher option price.
This will permit the issuance of new options if it should appear that the option
price provided in the outstanding options was less than the stock's fair market
value at the time of the grant.
17. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §422 (c)
(2); Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.422-2 (f)
(3),
29 Fed. Reg. 18072 (1964). Cancellation of outstanding options is thus ineffectual.
However, restricted options were permitted to be cancelled before the end of 1964
in order that options granted under the old law would not prevent utilization of
the new provisions.
18. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §422 (b) (4); Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.422-2 (e), 29
Fed. Reg. 18071 (1964).
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below, a good faith undervaluation will not disqualify the option altogether.
If the option is granted under a proper plan and meets the requirements set forth above, the grantee of the option will be in a
position to obtain favorable tax treatment on the exercise of the
option and on the eventual sale of the shares acquired under it. To
be entitled to favorable treatment, however, the individual exercising the option must have been an employee of the employer
corporation during the entire period from the date of grant up to
three months prior to his exercise of the option. 19 If this condition
is met and if the fair market value of the optioned stock was correctly estimated at the time the option was granted, the employee will
not be taxed on the bargain received at the time of exercise.2 0 If the
stock acquired under the option is held for at least three years, 21 the
total gain upon its sale will be taxed at capital gains rates. If the
stock is sold before the end of the three-year holding period, the
employee is treated as having received, during the year in which the
disposition was made, ordinary income equal to the excess of the
market value at the time of exercise over the option price. 22 Of course,
a capital gains tax (at long-term rates if the shares were held more
than six months) would also be payable on any excess of the sale
price of the shares over their market value when they were acquired,
and the employer would be entitled to a deduction for an amount
2
equal to the amount taxed to the employee as ordinary income. 3
THE PROBLEM OF FAIR MARKET VALUE

Priorto 1964 Amendments
Prior to the adoption of the 1964 amendments, the main obstacle
to a small business's adoption of a restricted stock option plan was
the requirement that the option price be not less than 85 per cent
of the fair market value of the stock on the date the option was
granted. Because stock of a closely held enterprise is not regularly
traded, there was no ascertainable market value on which to predicate
19.

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §422(a)(2); Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.421-7(h)(2),

29 Fed. Reg. 18065 (1964). Under prior law it was not necessary to be continuously employed during this period but only at the date of grant and at some
time within three months prior to exercise. See also note 14 supra.

20. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §421(a)(1); Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.421-8(a), 29
Fed. Reg. 18066 (1964).
21. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
22. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §421 (b); Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.421-8(b), 29
Fed. Reg. 18066 (1964).

23.

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §§162, 421 (b); Proposed Treas. Reg. §§1.421-6(f),

8 (b) (1), 29 Fed. Reg. 18064, 18066 (1964).
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an option price.24 Experts gave a great deal of thought to possible
methods of evaluating the equity in a close corporation, but they
discovered no adequate means of arriving at a safe estimate of value.25
The penalty for failing to achieve restricted status was the immediate taxation of the employee at ordinary income rates on the full
extent of the bargain received in exercising the option.
The refusal of the Internal Revenue Service to issue rulings with
respect to restricted status or the accuracy of valuatiols foreclosed
one means of escape from the uncertainty resulting from the valuation problem. 26 In addition, a provision for retroactive increase of
the exercise price could not be introduced to protect the optionee
against an underestimate of the stock's value.27 Having the stock
appraised by experts might have been helpful in the event of a contest with the Revenue Service but would have been far from conclusive, particularly since it was the stock's market value rather than
its intrinsic value that governed the option price. Moreover, the
valuation of the stock of a closely held company is exceedingly diffi24. The handicap to small enterprises was widely noted. Among others, Dean
Griswold recognized the anomaly that stock options are apt to be unavailable

where they would be most justified:
"Because of the limits to 95% or 85% of market value-in some cases, 110% a curious consequence develops. It is in small and closely held companies that
the stock option device may have its dearest justification. It is in such companies,
perhaps in need of better management, that an outsider can be brought in and

given the real incentive through a stock option of sharing in the improvement of
the company. It is in such companies, too, that the efforts of an individual can
have some impact on the value of the stock.
"Yet it is in just these smaller companies that determination of the fair market
value of the stock at any particular date is most troublesome and uncertain."
Griswold, Are Options Getting Out of Hand?, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1960,
pp. 49, 51; reprinted in Corp. Practice Commentator, May 1961, pp. 52, 56. See also
Moore, Stock Options for Directors in Small Corporations, 11 CLEv.-MAR. L. Rv.
396 (1962); Wallace, Should We Continue to Encourage the Use of Restricted Stock
Options?, 39 TAXEs 785 (1961); Schlesinger, Selected Problems in the Use of Restricted Stock Options, 36 TAxEs 709 (1958).
25. See, e.g., Schlesinger, The Utility and Feasibility of Stock Options in Close
Corporations, in TAXATION OF DEFERRm EMPLOYEE AND EXEcUTIVE COMPENSATION
580 (Sellin ed. 1960); Cox, Stock Arrangements for Executives, N.Y.U. 16TH INST.
ON FED. TAX 105 (1958); Lentz, Restricted Stock Options -. Problems of the Executive, N.Y.U. 14T INST. ON FED. TAx 1053 (1956); Bergen, Restricted Stock Options
for Executives of Closely Held Corporations, N.Y.U. 11T INsr. ON FED. TAX 145
(1953). See note 41 infra for a discussion of some suggestions for solving the
problem.
26. Rev. Rul. 59-243, 1959-2 CuM. BuLL. 123, amplified in Rev. Rul. 60-242,
1960-2 Cum. BULL. 158. Presumably these rulings will be equally applicable under
the new law.
27. Rev. Rul. 59-243, 1959-2 CuM. BuLL. 123, amplified in Rev. Rul. 60-242,
1960-2 Cum. BULL. 158. Under these rulings it was required that the option price
be fixed or determinable at the time the option was granted.
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cult, and expert appraisers are apt to differ widely in their conclusions.28
Penalty Tax on Employee Where UndervaluationOccurs
The 1964 amendments to the Code changed the requirement that
the option price be at least 85 per cent of the stock's value on the
date the option is granted to a requirement that the option price be
at least equal to such value.29 However, in an apparent attempt to

mitigate the penalty against the employees of a business that is
unable to determine the fair market value of its stock with certainty,
Congress provided that a good faith error in determining the option
price would not automatically require the taxation of the employee
to the full extent of the bargain received on the exercise of the option.
Under the new law, where a good faith undervaluation has occurred,
the employee, on the exercise of his option, will be taxed as if he
had received income equal to one and one-half times the amount of
the underestimate of market value. 30 If his actual gain on the exercise of the option is less than one and one-half times the amount of
the undervaluation, the actual gain will be the measure of his tax.
Example: An employee exercises an option to purchase 100 shares
at $100 each, and it is subsequently found that the fair market
value of the shares at the time the option was granted was $125
but that the $100 figure had been arrived at in good faith. If
the shares are currently worth $160, he will be taxed on $3,750 of
ordinary income (1 X $25 X 100). If the shares are worth only
$130, he will be taxed as having received $3,000 of compensation
($30 X 100).
28. One case has been heard of in which two investment banking houses and a
respected research company were called in to evaluate the company's common
stock on the basis of the price obtainable in a public offering. They reached
results of $4, $7.50, and $12 per share, respectively. The option price was then
set at around $16 per share, and no trouble was encountered. A few months
after the options were granted, another investment banking house approached
the company to suggest "going public" at a price in excess of $30 per share. One
of the reasons for turning down this suggestion was the probable effect on the
outstanding stock options. See also the reference to the experience of Ford Motor

Company in Rothschild, supra note I, at 405.
29. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §422(b)(4); Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.422-2(e)(1),
29 Fed. Reg. 18071 (1964).
30. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §422(c)(1). Reliance on appraisals would be
sufficient to establish good faith in setting the price. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th

Cong., IstSess. A68 (1963) (suggesting use of "an average of the fair market values
set forth in the opinions of completely independent and well-qualified experts').
See also Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.422-2 (e) (2) (ii), 29 Fed. Reg. 18071 (1964), which

adopts the quoted language from the House Committee Report.
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The employee's basis in the shares for capital gains purposes is increased by the amount taxed to him as ordinary income under the
penalty tax provisions. 31
Employer's Deduction in the Event of Undervaluation
Under the rules relating to restricted stock options, the employer
was entitled to a deduction for any amounts taxed as ordinary income to an employee on his exercise of the option as a result of the
32
employer's failure to comply with the option price requirement.
The 1964 amendments appear to deny the employer a similar deduction in every case where the employee is taxed under the penalty
tax provisions outlined above33 This denial of the deduction results
from the provision in section 422 (c) (1) that a good faith undervaluation of the stock in setting the option price does not, as formerly,
disqualify the option altogether but merely requires the imposition of
the penalty tax.
The denial of a deduction under circumstances analogous to
those under which it was previously permitted greatly increases the
aggregate of the adverse tax consequences to the employer and employee of a failure to meet the option price requirement. It is hard
to believe that this result was actually intended by Congress since
there is no specific indication in the legislative history that the denial
of the deduction was deliberate3 4 and the congressional reports clearly
reflect the belief that the penalty tax alone would be sufficient to
encourage compliance with the option price requirement.5 More31. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §422 (c) (1); Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.422-2 (e) (2) (i),
29 Fed. Reg. 18071 (1964).
32. Treas. Reg. §1.421-6 (f) (1959), as amended, T.D. 6540, 1961-1 Cum. BULL.
161.
33. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§421-(a) (2), 422 (c) (1). The Proposed Regulations
confirm this reading. Proposed Treas. Reg. §§1.421-6 (a), (f), 1.422-1 (b) (3) (Example 6), 29 Fed. Reg. 18064, 18070 (1964).
34. The impression that the result was inadvertent is based in part on the
assumption that Congress was in fact attempting to improve the competitive
position of small businesses vis-A-vis companies with widely traded stock. No
such intention is expressed in the legislative history, but it seems fair to infer it
from the specific effort made to ameliorate the employee's adverse consequences
where the option price requirement is not met. The extensive literature documenting the hardship to the closely held firm (see note 24 supra) surely did not
escape congressional notice. Moreover, most of the criticism of options centered
on their use in the largest firms. See President's 1963 Tax Message 459-97. Such
of the criticism as concerned small companies (id. at 492-93) was obviated by the
new rules prohibiting substantial shareholders from participating in the program.
INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, §422(b) (7). See note 52 infra and accompanying text.
35. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1964); H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1963).
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over, it is difficult to think of other situations in which the tax law
denies the employer a deduction on grounds other than unreasonableness while taxing the employee on the receipt of compensation.36 The
denial of the employer's deduction in the 1964 amendments may
well have been a legislative drafting blunder resulting from a combination of (1) the carryover in haec verba of language in section
421 (a) (2) clarifying that no deduction would be permitted where
the option achieved restricted (now qualified) status, and (2) the
introduction of section 422 (c) (1) preserving qualified status merely
as a device for preserving favorable tax treatment of the option while
exacting the penalty tax.
The anomaly created by Congress in denying the employer a deduction where the penalty tax applies is particularly apparent when
it is recognized that in many cases the employer and employee will
bear a lesser aggregate tax burden if the noncompliance was the result of bad faith rather than of mere inability to make an accurate
appraisal. In the example set forth above, two situations were hypothesized, involving market values of $160 and $130 at the time
the option was exercised. Since good faith in setting the option price
was assumed, the employer would not have been entitled to a deduction in either case. If, however, the employer should have established
its own bad faith, it would have been allowed a deduction equal to
the amount taxable to the employee in each instance - $6,000 and
$3,000 (the excess of market value over the option price), respectively.
Note that the savings accruing to the employer through the deduction (assuming a 48 per cent tax rate) would be $2,880 and $1,440
in the respective situations, whereas there would be an increased tax
cost to the employee only in the first case. This increased cost would
36. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §424 (c) (I), carries over provisions of prior law
which have the effect of denying the employer a deduction where the employee is
taxed on an amount of ordinary income as a result of the employer's setting of an
option price between 85% and 95% of fair market value at the time of grant. See
notes 6 and 7 supra. (INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §423 (c), has a similar effect.) This
fact might be regarded as persuasive that there was an intent to deny the deduction as well in the case of an undervaluation in setting the exercise price of a
qualified option. However, under the restricted option provisions, there is no
penalty whatsoever to the employee where the option price falls in the 85-95%
range, although a delayed tax is ultimately exacted on the amount of the original
"spread" at ordinary income rates upon the stock's eventual sale or the employee's
death. The new penalty tax rules, which are applicable only to qualified options,
were introduced to mitigate the serious tax penalty that attached where the
minimum (i.e., 85%) price requirement was not met. No reason appears why the
employer should lose the deduction that was allowed under those penalty provisions which Congress intended to ameliorate.
For an unsuccessful attempt under other circumstances to deny an employer a
deduction when the employee became taxable on the receipt of compensation, see
Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. United States, 314 F.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
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be the difference between a tax payable currently on $2,250 at ordinary income rates and a capital gains tax on that amount levied when
the stock acquired under the option is finally sold.
Because bad faith in setting. the option price would entitle the
employer to a deduction by disqualifying the option, an employer
that takes a purely selfish view of the transaction will in each case
refuse to assert that it acted in good faith. The employee's interest
will generally be best served by establishing that the price was arrived
at in good faith, although in some cases-where the penalty tax is
measured by the employee's actual gain- it will make no difference
how the price was set. In most cases it will be within the employer's
power to elect whether or not to contend that the option price was
established in good faith. 37 Thus, there appears to be a significant
alternative to the kind of tax treatment that prevailed prior to the
1964 amendments, although the old treatment is in every case more
advantageous from the employer's point of view. Nevertheless, the
new penalty tax provisions reduce the substantial tax burden on the
employee that resulted under prior law from a minor miscalculation
of the option price. Employers will often be willing to forego a deduction in order to preserve the favorable tax treatment of the
employee.
The strange result that seems to flow from the Code amendments
in 1964-namely, that an employer may receive more advantageous
tax treatment if it acted in bad faith than if it merely made an honest
miscalculation -would probably have justified the Commissioner in
promulgating proposed Regulations allowing an employer to deduct
the amount of a good faith undervaluation on which a penalty tax
is predicated; the proposed Regulations might also have allowed a
deduction for the full amount treated as taxable to the employee
where his actual bargain on exercise is less than one and one-half
times the amount of the undervaluation. 3s It seems extremely unlikely
37. Theoretically, the employee might assert the employer's good faith while

the employer argued that it had in fact acted in bad faith. In this way, each might
enjoy the most favorable tax treatment, although one or both of them would
undoubtedly be required to litigate the question. Cf. Estate of Lauson Stone, 19
T.C. 872 (1953), aff'd, 210 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1954) (employer's claim of a deduction
in another type of situation involving stock options did not determine the tax

treatment of the employee).
38. The Commissioner's position in adopting suh rules would have to be
that the taxpayer ought to have the option of not pleading good faith if such a
plea would result in a greater tax. However, it is only in the latter situation mentioned in the text that the tax treatment would coincide with the treatment where
bad faith in the valuation effort is established. In the other case, the deduction
would be limited to the amount of the undervaluation, which is the portion of
the employee's gain that is most clearly compensatory. In the example set forth
earlier in the text, the employer would be entitled to deductions of $2,500 and
$3,000 in the respective situations postulated.
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that the Commissioner's final Regulations will change the handling
of these matters in the proposed Regulations.39 For this reason, it is
difficult to conclude that the 1964 amendments benefited small business as much as small businessmen had a right to expect.
PRACTICAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE UTILITY OF QUALIFIED OPTIONS
IN SMALL BUSINESSES

The penalty tax imposed on the employee for the employer's
undervaluation of the shares subject to option would not be a serious
problem if there were any assurance that the amount of the undervaluation would be only minor. However, the difficulty of reaching
even an approximate market value is in many cases so great that the
penalty could be quite serious. For example, an employee exercising
an option to acquire 100 shares of stock at $50 each would be faced
with a tax on $7,500 of ordinary income if the market value at the
time the option was granted were subsequently found to be twice
the option price.40 Such an employee would have received no cash
with which to pay the tax imposed and might find it necessary, and
exceedingly difficult, to liquidate his holdings in order to obtain cash
to meet the tax liability. The seriousness of the risk to the employee
is sufficient that, in the absence of some objective evidence of actual
market value, closely held companies will be forced to place an unreasonably high value on their stock in setting an option price.
Likelihood of Overvaluation of Optioned Shares
From time to time in the life of most small businesses events occur
that provide evidence of the current market value of the company's
shares. For example, a valuation of a minority interest in the company for purposes of the federal estate tax or the sale by the corporation or a shareholder of a minority interest would probably provide
a reliable indication of market value. The frequency of such events
depends largely on the width of the stock's distribution and fortuitous factors, and prices set on the basis of them are not guaranteed freedom from attack. In the typical small business there will
usually be no reliable objective evidence of fair market value on
which an option price can be predicated.
39. See Proposed Treas. Reg. §§1.421-6 (a), (f), 1.422-1 (b) (3) (Example 6), 29
Fed. Reg. 18064, 18070 (1964).
40. The 1964 amendments to the Code introduced averaging provisions which
permit taxpayers with large fluctuations in income from year to year to pay tax

at a lower rate in the years of peak earnings.

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §§1301-05.

These provisions would be available to an employee who became taxable under
the penalty tax provisions discussed here.
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Since there is no known method of obtaining an advance indication from the Internal Revenue Service as to the accuracy of a valuation of closely held stock, 4 1 the small employer's sole protection generally lies in thoroughly documenting the case for the value chosen
and in attaching to the stock the highest value that might conservatively be deemed reasonable. If this is done and if subsequent events
do not reveal an egregious error, it is unlikely that a penalty tax will
be imposed since the penalty provisions seem to have been inserted in
the Code primarily for the purpose of compelling closely held businesses to adopt conservative valuations and of alleviating the Internal
Revenue Service's task of strictly policing valuations in every case.
Nevertheless, where the stock subject to option appreciates rapidly,
as it is hoped it will, the likelihood of Revenue Service secondguessing is increased.
To the extent that the option price selected exceeds the stock's
actual value as a result of an overly conservative judgment in setting
the price, the option program will be of reduced value to the employees. Indeed, the five-year life of the option may not be a sufficient
period for the actual value to catch up with the option price established. Moreover, because a new option providing a lower option
price cannot be exercised until previously outstanding options have
expired or been exercised, an overvaluation cannot be effectively corrected by the granting of new options.42 Because the company whose
stock is publicly traded has no problem in valuing its shares, it is
able to assure its employees that they will receive the full measure
of benefit from a qualified stock option plan. Small businesses will
not ordinarily be able to give such an assurance and will consequently remain handicapped in competing with large companies for
managerial and other talent.
41. Some suggestions have been made, but they have generally failed to provide an adequate solution. One writer has suggested that a stock bonus be given
the employee concurrently with the option so that the value of the stock could
be tested immediately upon the employer's claim of a deduction for the fair
market value of the stock. Cox, supra note 25, at 127. However, because the
bonus is also income to the employee, the Revenue Service might assert a high
value that would destroy the value of the option. Also, it is not clear how acquiescence in the valuation of the bonus would bind the Revenue Service for
other purposes.
Use of restrictions on transferability to depress the market value of the optioned
stock has also been suggested as a means of creating a margin of safety. Rothschild, supra note 1, at 406-07; Bergen, supra note 25, at 151-58. This expedient
would yield utterly unpredictable tax results and, very likely a lawsuit if relied
upon as a solution to valuation problems. See note 51 infra and accompanying
text.
42. INT. R y. CODE OF 1954 §§422(b)(5), (c)(6); Proposed Treas. Reg.
§1.422-2 (f) (1), 29 Fed. Reg. 18071-72 (1964). On the other hand, an undervaluation
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Absence of Market for Acquired Shares
Even if the small corporation should effectively overcome the
problem of valuing its stock, perhaps by obtaining a bona fide
offer for a minority interest, the qualified stock option would probably be less useful to it as compensation technique than it would
be to a publicly held company. One problem would be the absence
of a market for stock that the employees might obtain under the
option. While many employees in large companies have been satisfied to retain the stock obtained through the exercise of an option,
others have regularly disposed of it after the passing of the six-month
holding period required by the Code for restricted options. 43 Without an existing market, disposition would be extremely difficult unless
other shareholders or the corporation would be willing and able to
purchase the stock. Redemption of the stock by the employer corporation might be the best method of permitting the employee to cash
in on the option, but new problems might be raised if the redemption price could not be justified; the tax would be at ordinary income rates to the extent that the redemption price exceeded fair
value. Also, requests for redemption might come at times when the
cash supply of the business was reduced or otherwise committed.
The importance of a market for disposing of stock obtained under
an option may be greater in a small business than in a large one.
Stock in a closely held enterprise is often an unsatisfactory investment
because of the uncertain dividend policies of the controlling shareholders. Also, the long-term prospects of the business may not be
such that an equity interest is a good speculation, and, in any event,
a degree of diversification of investments is normally advisable. For
these reasons, large-scale use of options as a compensation medium
requires some assurance that the shares will be readily disposable
after the holding period has expired. If the purpose is merely to give
employees a permanent stake in the business, a market for the shares
will not be essential, and use of the plan will probably be on a smaller
scale since employees may be less interested in committing a large
portion of their personal assets.
4

Difficulty of FinancingExercise of Options"

The 1964 amendments to the Code, by increasing the minimum
holding period from six months to three years and the minimum
could be corrected by granting a new option at a higher price upon the occurrence

of an event which reveals the true market value.
43. See note 8 supra.
44. The most thorough discussion of this problem, as it existed under the
old law, is Rothschild, Financing Stock Purchases by Executives, Harv. Bus. Rev.,
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option price from 85 per cent to 100 per cent of market value, increased the duration and the amount of the investment required
to take advantage of stock options. In addition, shortening the permitted life of the option has somewhat reduced the possibility that
market value will be sufficiently in excess of the exercise price that
exercise of the option can be easily financed. The financing problems
thus created are multiplied in the case of employees of a firm whose
stock is not actively traded. It might also be noted that the option's
shorter life under the new law also lessens the likelihood that an
active market for such a firm's stock will have developed by the time
it is desired to exercise the option.
Employees of publicly held corporations can ordinarily obtain
partial financing for exercise of a stock option by pledging the shares
acquired. While under Federal Reserve margin rules no more than
30 per cent of the market value of listed shares can be obtained in
this manner,45 larger amounts can probably be borrowed to purchase
stock that is actively traded in the over-the-counter market. However,
banks will normally be unwilling to accept as collateral shares having
no established market or value. Bank financing might be obtainable
if the corporation or another shareholder was willing and able to
undertake to repurchase the shares from the pledgee if the loan
should not be repaid, but such an arrangement might be unsatisfactory because of the strain on the employer's credit resources.
If bank financing of exercise of the option cannot be obtained at
a reasonable cost, the corporation might allow payment for the stock
to be made in installments. This is a common arrangement and the
one most likely to be employed by small firms. The employee must
have a fixed obligation to pay for the stock,46 and substantial interest
must be payable on this obligation.47 In addition, care must be taken
that state laws or charter provisions governing payment for shares-

Mar.-Apr. 1957, p. 136. Emphasis is placed on the undesirability of self-financing
through the sale of shares acquired under old options to provide funds for the
exercise of new ones. Id. at 137-39.
45. Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. §221.4 (1963).
46. Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.421-7 (f), 29 Fed. Reg. 18065 (1964); Rev. Rul.
54-467, 1954-2 CuM. BuL.T 207.
47. INT. Rry. CODE OF 1954, §483, which was added to the Code in the 1964
amendments, would identify "unstated" interest if the rate paid by the employee
was less than an amount prescribed by the Commissioner, currently 4%. Temporary Treas. Reg. §19.3-1 (b), Ti). 6720, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 622. Allocation of
some of the purchase price to interest might have the effect of disqualifying the
option by reducing the effective option price below the fair market value of the
stock on the date of grant. Query whether the good faith requirement could be
claimed to have been met under these circumstances.
48. See generally MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. §§16, 18, 23 (1960).
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and loans to employees49 are not violated. Use of this form of
financing will increase the cost of the plan to the employer unless the
interest charge is commensurate with what the firm could earn by
otherwise employing its capital. The amount of funds that might
be tied up in this manner might be considerable, and there is undoubtedly a practical limit on the amount of use that can be made
of this financing technique in any business. The necessity for relying
exclusively on installment sales as a means of financing the exercise
of stock options is another aspect of the handicap under which small
firms operate in this area.
Effect on Control Arrangements
Another drawback to a stock option arrangement in a closely
held enterprise might be the disruptive effect that dispersion of stock
among employees might have upon existing control arrangements. 50
Within the context of the close corporation, creation of new minority
stock interests may bring about some obligation to declare dividends
and perhaps to give the new shareholders a voice on the board of
directors. The use of nonvoting shares as the subject of the option
might solve some problems but would not guarantee that an unmanageable dissident minority would not arise.
To achieve a degree of control over the dispersion of the stock or
the identity of subsequent purchasers, the employer may impose restrictions on the transferability of the stock acquired under options.
The most suitable such restriction is usually a simple right of first
refusal in favor of the corporation or the controlling shareholders in
the event of a proposed sale. 51
Ineligibility of Certain Shareholder-Employees
Qualified stock options may not be used to benefit employees who
are also substantial shareholders of the employer corporation.52 In
49. See generally MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. §4 (f) (1960).
50. For a discussion of the danger that employees, upon becoming shareholders,
might at some time attempt to interfere with management, see O'NEAL & DERWIN,
EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS AssoCIATEs: "SQuEEZE-OuTs" IN SMALL ENTERPRISES §2.14 (1961).

51.

Such a restriction would not affect the value of the shares. Restrictions

on alienability or providing an artificial repurchase price would render the stock's
fair market value unascertainable and would greatly complicate the tax situation.

See note 41 supra.

52. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§422(b)(7), (c)(3); Proposed Treas. Reg.
§1.422-2(h), 29 Fed. Reg. 18073-74 (1964). Prior law permitted 10% shareholders
to participate if the option price was at least 110% of fair market value and the
option had a duration of no more than five years. One objection to the restricted
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companies having a "net capital" of $1 million or less, shareholderemployees having more than 10 per cent of the stock (by voting power
or value) may not participate. In larger companies the percentage
limitation is reduced so that in companies with net capital of $2 million or more the holding of more than 5 per cent of the stock disqualifies an employee from enjoying tax benefits. The maximum
shareholdings for a beneficiary of a qualified option in a company
with net capital between $1 million and $2 million is determined by
prorating the additional 5 per cent allowed to the smallest companies. Thus, a shareholder-employee in a company with $1,600,000
of equity could qualify for favorable tax treatment if he owned no
more than 7 per cent of the stock.
Under these provisions, large businesses and small businesses are
subjected to different requirements, which, while making a concession to smaller companies, nevertheless remain potentially discriminatory against them. It is apparent that an officer of a publicly held
business, whose shareholdings in his employer may be many times
the value of the employer's stock held by his small business counterpart, will not usually be barred by the 5 per cent requirement from
participating in a qualified option program. On the other hand, a
relatively small investment in a small business can deprive an employee of this class of tax benefits.
Economic Drawbacks of Stock Options
The main justification for using stock options in a small business
is probably the competitive necessity for offering a benefit comparable
to those offered by larger firms. In the absence of such competitive
pressure, stock options have very little to recommend them in a small
business context, not only because of the considerations reviewed
above but also because an option is seldom an economically sound
compensation medium. This is particularly true in the light of the
recent major reductions in individual tax rates in the higher brackets.
The primary drawback of options is quite simply their cost relative
to compensation paid in cash. This cost is not always recognized
because it is met through dilution of the equity of other shareholders
and does not appear in the income statement, but it is nevertheless
real. Moreover, because no tax deduction is allowed for compensaoption provisions was the large capital gain sometimes reaped by controlling
shareholders of a closely held company. See President's 1963 Tax Message 492-93.
INT. REv. CODE or 1954, §422(c) (3) (C), provides that, in determining the

extent of an employee's shareholdings for purposes of applying the eligibility rules,
he shall be treated as owning all shares that he has a right to purchase under outstanding options of any kind, including the option to be granted. This provision

further narrows the class of eligible employees.
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A
tion paid in this manner, the cost is multiplied substantially.
$192.31
corporation could pay out in deductible cash compensation
for each $100 in remuneration granted via the option route at the
same net cost to itself (assuming a 48 per cent tax rate). The net
after-tax benefit to the employee of the respective types of compensation will, of course, vary with the tax rate applicable to the cash payment and the timing of the disposition of stock acquired by option.
However, even if we assume the most beneficial tax results of employing the qualified option- namely, that the employee holds the
stock until death and thereby avoids all tax on his gain- it still appears that the corporation would achieve a better net result by paying
cash compensation to all employees whose incremental current income
would be taxed at a rate less than 52 per cent. Since only the amount
in excess of $52,000 of a married taxpayer's taxable income is taxed
at so high a rate, the significance of the above observation is clear.
If it is assumed that the optioned stock will be sold, and the gain
taxed, after the three-year holding period expires, the marginal tax
54
bracket is substantially higher.
The only possible countervailing economic advantage of stock
options is the contingent nature of the gain to the employee. Since
the value of the option accrues only as the employer's stock appreciates, the corporation is not out of pocket until the performance of
its stock has justified the payment. Of course, similar results could
be accomplished by means of well-designed profit-sharing arrangements with individual employees- or through a "phantom" stock
plan for selected key men. 56 Nevertheless, a real and substantial equity
interest in a small corporation, originally created in the form of a
qualified option, may have an intangible incentive value that cannot
be duplicated by a cash program.

CONCLUSION

Situations can be visualized in which the qualified stock option
would serve the purposes of a small business admirably. Indeed, it is
precisely in the smaller business that the exceptional endeavors of
one or a few key men in management positions are most likely to be
reflected in the value of the stock, and many examples of the suc53. For a review of cost considerations under the old law and rates, see President's 1963 Tax Message 484-87.
54. One writer concludes that the dividing line under these circumstances is
61%, which rate is applicable only to married taxpayers with taxable income in
excess of $100,000. Baker, Employee Stock Option Plans Under the Revenue Act

of 1964, 20
55.
56.

TAX

L. REv. 77, 121 n.174 (1964).

See HAVIGHURST,
See id. at 334-42.

DEFERRED COMPENSATION FOR KEY EMPLOYEES
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cessful use of stock options in small but growing companies can be
cited. Nevertheless, numerous considerations suggest that the qualified stock option cannot easily be adapted to the needs of the ordinary
closely held corporation. These considerations lead to the conclusion
that Congress might have better served the interests of small business
by eliminating the stock option device entirely than by slightly increasing its availability to the closely held business. 57 If the big
company's advantages were to be reduced by deleting tax-favored
stock options from the Internal Revenue Code, the competition for
capable employees would center more in the areas of cash and deferred
compensation, where the small business operates under fewer and less
artificial handicaps.

57. President Kennedy's 1963 tax reform proposals would have substantially
done away with the tax benefits of stock options by taxing the employee at ordinary income rates on the full extent of his gain measured at the time of exercise.
The effective rate would have been reduced by averaging provisions, and the
burden of the tax would have been eased by provision for payment in installments
over a period of years. See President's 1963 Tax Message 25, 147-48, 460-61.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

19

